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I. INTRODUCTION 
The present note is  intended as  a further  contribution to the  debate  sparked  off by  the 
German proposal for a "stability pact for Europe"  aiming  at  ensuring fiscal  discipline  in 
Stage three of El\1U.  Compared to the previous notes established for the attention of the 
. Monetary Committee (II/0 11/96-EN and II/099/96-EN), a number of specific, though still 
tentative,  proposals for  devising  and  implementing  a stability pact are put forward.  The 
note, which is  drawn under the responsibility of Commission services, takes into account 
the  discussions  that have  already  taken place  in  the Monetary  Committee  and  aims  at 
gathering a consensus on a possible way forward.  However, .it is  no way attempts to  set 
out the conclusions that the Commission may reach at the end of  the current discussions or 
prejudge the preferred option by the Commission. 
The various aspects of a possible pact - economic,  budgetary, legal and procedural - are 
examined.  An annex  deals  with  the  possible  ways  to  increase  market  pressure  in  the 
direction of  fiscal prudence. 
A number of  items require more in-depth exploration. In particular, the question of  how to 
implement the agreement in practice, including the need for specific secondary legislation, 
needs further analysis.  The question of the appropriate scale of sanctions to be applied in 
the case of  excessive budget deficits has not yet been addressed. 
II. ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY ASPECTS 
.  II.l MACROECONO:rvtiC STABILISATION IN STAGE THREE OF El\1U 
The introduction of  a single currency and the creation of  a European Central Bank implies 
that a single monetary policy is set for EMU as a whole. Moreover, the priority objective 
of  the ECB is to preserve price stability. Therefore, budgetary policy, which remains under 
the  responsibility  of  national  authorities,  will  have  a  more  important  role  in 
macroeconomic stabilisation  across the economic  cycle  an9  in the event of asymmetric 
shocks1. 
1  Other mechanisms of adjustment play an equally important role.  In particular, higher wage flexibility 
and better functioning  goods  and service markets are needed in preventing country-specific  shocks 
from resulting in heavy output and job losses. - 4-
Fiscal policy needs to pursue a twofold aim: 
- perform a shock-absorption function at the national level; and 
- allow the establishing of  an optimal macroeconomic policy mix at the EMU level. 
In order to meet the first objective, a degree of  flexibility has to be left to national budgets 
in  order to  let  automatic  stabilisers  work  across  the  cycle  and  to  allow  discretionary 
measures in  the  case  of country-specific  shocks.  Preserving  the  necessary  flexibility  to 
cope  with  adverse  economic  events  requires  a  sound  fiscal  discipline  under  normal 
economic  circumstances  so  as  to  prevent  the  emergence  of unsustainable  budgetary 
positions which would risk jeopardising the financial stability of  EMU. The dual constraint 
of discipline  and  flexibility  is  clearly  recognised  by  the  Treaty  which,  whilst  leaving 
budgetary policy under the  responsibility  of Member  States,  sets  Community  rules  and 
procedures to avoid excessive public deficits and debts. 
According to the second objective, national budgetary policies should together achieve an 
appropriate fiscal  stance  for  EMU as  a whole.  Fiscal  prudence is  essential  in  order to 
preserve a stability-oriented monetary policy2.  However,  attaining the appropriate EMU-
wide fiscal  stance  and,  in  turn,  the  right  fiscal  and  monetary  policy mix,  also  requires 
addressing the issue of fiscal policy co-ordination over the cycle or in the face of common 
symmetric  shocks.  This would then entail  the assessment  of the  ex-ante  consistency of 
national budgetary policies in the final  equilibrium - when medium-term targets will have 
been attained - as well as in the transition period. Treaty provisions concerning budgetary 
policy  co-ordination  - within  the  broader  scope  of economic  policy  co-ordination  as 
covered by art.  103  - are less detailed than those related to fiscal  discipline and  still in an 
early stage of  implementation. 
II.2 ENSURING  FISCAL  DISCIPLINE  IN  STAGE  THREE:  THE  GERMAN 
STABILITY PACT PROPOSAL 
As stated above, maintaining budgetary discipline in stage three is an essential condition to 
reap all the benefits of  the single currency.  Sound public finances are important not only to 
allow  automatic  stabilisers  to  function  without  giving  rise  to  unsustainable  budgetary 
positions, but also to foster low and stable inflationary expectations, to provide conditions 
2  Fiscal  discipline  will  play a particularly important role  in the initial period of EMU  to  reduce  the 
likelihood or the costs  of a possible market testing of the anti-inflationary credibility  of the newly 
established ECB. - 5 -
for  higher medium-term growth and  in  order to address the budgetary consequences of 
ageing. 
In  this  light,  the  overriding  concern  of the  stability  pact  proposal  is  to  provide  the 
necessary conditions to ensure fiscal discipline in stage three of  EMU. While clearly stating 
that no re-negotiation of the Maastricht criteria for participation in the single currency is 
envisaged,  the draft  stability  pact puts forward  a  number  of proposals  to implement  a 
permanent  fiscal  discipline  in  stage  three.  Member  States  should  enter  a  voluntary 
commitment encompassing the following elements: 
- respecting  the  3%  deficit  limit  set  in  the Treaty,  even  in  economically unfavourable 
periods, with exceptions being granted only in extreme cases; 
- setting a medium-term goal of 1% of GDP for the budget deficit,  thereby providing a 
safety margin of2% ofGDP under the 3% mandatory ceiling; 
- reducing progressively the stock of debt even below. the level of 60% of GDP indicated 
in the Treaty; 
- keeping down the share of the public sector in the economy by,  in particular, bringing 
down the rate of  growth of  public expenditure below that of  nominal GDP. 
According to the proposal, this set of commitments, by ens:uring a reduction in the interest 
burden on public  debt,  would  allow  the  focusing  of government  expenditure  on public 
investment, whilst gaining room for manoeuvre to limit future budget risks. 
II.3 THE J\tiEDIUM-TERM OBJECTIVE OF FISCAL POLICY 
In order to provide guidance to markets and to orientate the adjustment efforts of policy 
makers, it seems appropriate to set a medium-term target for budgetary policy. 
Whilst  a  single  target  across EMU members  has  the clear  advantage  of simplicity  and 
visibility,  it  is  also  characterised  by  a  number  of drawbacks.  In  particular,  in  view  of 
differing degrees of  real convergence and demographic prospects amongst Member States, , 
national  budgetary  policies  face  different  medium-term  constraints.  Furthermore,  the 
budgetary  room  for  manoeuvre  needed  to  accommodate  cyclical  developments  varies 
across Member States and it is frequently higher - especiaily amongst smaller countries -
than that allowed by the stability pact proposal.  Finally,  whatever medium-term target is 
eventually retained, as the "degree of hardship"  in bringing down and  sustaining a lower 
deficit  depends  on  the  initial  level  of the  stock  of debt,  different  time  spans  for  the 
transition are likely  to be called  for.  It is  also  important to  stress that a uniform target 
would in no way replace the co-ordination effort addressed in section II.l. - 6 -
A sustained budget balance below the Maastricht reference value automatically implies that 
the public debt ratio converges - and reasonably quickly, under normal assumptions on the 
rate of  growth of  nominal GDP - to a long run equilibrium level well below 60% of GDP3. 
Therefore,  imposing a further constraint on the debt level  seems  redundant  and  risks to 
overdetermining the system unnecessarily. 
As  to  the  indication  of  progressively  reducing  the  public  expenditure  ratio,  any 
implementation would need to take into account the below-average levels of expenditure 
in the catching-up countries and their greater public investment needs. Furthermore, while 
restraining  public  expenditure  increases  should  be  the  preferred  approach  in  many 
countries,  as  stated  by  the  broad  economic  policy  guidelines,  this  recommendation 
essentially  applies to the transition period rather than to the final  equilibrium.  Although 
some developments (e.g.  tax competition on mobile factors or welfare state reform) will 
point in the longer run to a lower share of government in the economy, the choice of  the 
combination of expenditure and  revenue to sustain the medium-term budgetary position 
will largely lie with the political preferences of  national authorities. 
The above considerations point to the following conclusions: 
a)  a certain degree of differentiation in national medium-term budgetary targets appears to 
be desirable from an economic point of  view; 
b)  a  deficit  target  of 1%  of GDP  - as  in  the  stability  pact  proposal  - seems  therefore 
arbitrary  and,  in  the  case  of several  countries,  not  sufficient  either to  accommodate 
cyclical developments or face the budgetary consequences of  the ageing structure of  the 
population; 
c)  once a credible medium-term budgetary target well below the 3.% of  GDP is retained at 
the national level,  there is  no  need for additional constraints on the public  ~ebt-GDP 
ratio. 
d)  a budgetary target for EMU as a whole which would represent a sort of "medium-term 
fiscal  anchor"  would  help  in  stepping  up  co-ordination  efforts  and,  by  increasing 
visibility and transparency, would foster surveillance by the market. 
3  For instance, a sustained budget deficit  of 1%  of GDP  implies,  under a  "normal"  rate of growth of 
nominal  GDP  of 5%,  a  long run equilibrium level  of 20% of GDP.  Furthermore,  under the  same 
assumptions,  a country with an initial level  of debt  of 120% of GDP  would reduce its debt  ratio by 
almost 40 points within ten years. - 7 -
II.4 THE ECONO:MIC AND BUDGETARY FRAN.fEWORK OF A STABILITY PACT 
On the basis of  the conclusions of  the previous section, the stability pact could encompass 
the following elements: 
1.  EU  and national budgetary targets 
- an EMU-wide medium-term budgetary goal of close to balance,  as  set in the broad 
economic policy  guidelines,  taking into  account that some factors would  allow  a 
certain degree of national differentiation both in the objective and in the transition 
·adjustment path; 
- the requirement for Member States to set a national medium-term target, the path to 
achieve it and the self-correcting mechanisms/measures which would be implemented 
in the case of  slippage·not justified by purely cyclical developments. 
2.  Community ''green light" and monitoring 
- the credibility and the appropriateness of national budgetary targets and adjustment 
paths will be assessed at the EU level, in particular with a view to identifYing the risk 
of budget deficits overtaking the 3% reference value and their compatibility with the 
EMU budgetary stance; 
- a  regular surveillance  of budgetary developments will  take place at the EU level, 
which in particular assesses deviations from  the medium-term target and monitors 
the implementation of the agreed correcting measures.  This monitoring exercise is 
particularly important during the transition period in which automatic stabilisers,  if 
allowed to operate fully,  could  easily  exhaust  the  available  room for  manoeuvre 
under the 3% ceiling in the case of adverse cyclical behaviour.  It also represents an 
essential building block of any co-ordination effort to be carried out in assessing the 
overall consistency of  the budgetary stance at the EMU level. 
These aspects will be addressed in greater detail in section IV. - 8 -
ill. INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL QUESTIONS 
III.l TWO MAIN OPTIONS 
The Treaty already  enshrines  the  objectives  of the  proposed stability  pact and  provides 
scope for the adoption of  secondary legislation which could incorporate many elements of 
Mr. Waigel proposal4. Two broad legal options are available which could be used together 
to  apply  a  stability  pact.  Co-ordination  measures  could  be  developed  in  the  broad 
economic policy guidelines and  multilateral surveillance procedure set out in  Article 103, 
whereas  control  aspects  could  be  defined  in  the  excessive  deficit  procedure  of Article 
104c.  The use  of other  Treaty  provisions  (e.g.  Article  235)  or the  adoption  of inter-
institutional  agreements  for  developing  aspects  of  a  stability  pact  would  not  be 
appropriate. 
Article 103: The broad economic policy guidelines and multilateral surveillance procedure 
provide a framework  for the co-ordination and  monitoring  of Member States'  economic 
policies outside the disciplinary framework of the excessive deficit procedure.  The broad  _ 
economic policy guidelines  are  adopted annually by  the  Summer European Council  and 
focus  on medium  and  long-term  economic  strategies.  As  such,  it might  be  desirable  to 
enshrine the basic objectives of a stability pact in  the broad economic policy guidelines: 
however, it would not be a suitable place for establishing operational rules and procedures 
of  a pact. 
There  exists  considerable  scope  for  developing  the  operational  procedures  of the 
multilateral  surveillance  exercise. 5  Legislation  could  be  adopted  on the basis  of Article 
103(5) by qualified majority voting in accordance with the procedure of article  189c (i.e. 
after having obtained the opinion of the European Parliament). It could govern all  aspects · 
of the multilateral  surveillance procedure including the  adoption of stability programmes 
by  Member  States.  Legislation  could  also  specify  procedures  under  1  03(  4),  e.g.  the 
conditions under which the economic policies of a Member State would not be considered 
"consistent with  the  broad guidelines ....  or risk jeopardising the proper functioning of 
economic  and moneta1y  union".  In  addition,  it  would  be  possible  to  elaborate  the 
conditions under which the Council would make its recommendations public. 
4  However,  secondary legislation could  not provide automaticity in the determination of an excessive 
deficit situation or the imposition of sanctions. Setting up a Stability Council without participation of 
all Member States would be incompatible with the Treaty (although the Treaty allows for suspension of 
voting rights in some cases). 
5  The broad content and purpose of the multilateral surveillance exercise was laid down in the Council 
Decision 90/141/EEC of 12 March 1990, OJ L 78 of 24.03.90. - 9-
Article 1 04c: two legal bases for Council legislation on the excessive deficit procedure are 
provided  in  Article  104c(14):  replacement  of the  Protocol  on  the  excessive  deficit 
procedure (2nd subparagraph) and amending Regulation 3605/93 which specifies technical 
definitions  of the  provisions  of that  Protocol  (3rd  subparagraph)6.  However,  any 
legislation must not contradict the Treaty.  Therefore, procedural arrangements as well  as 
. the nature of sanctions which are set out in the Treaty could not be changed.  They could 
only be clarified by definitions,  deadlines,  etc., provided the principle of proportionality is 
respected. 
There is  an important" difference in the scope of the two legal bases of Article  1  04c(14). 
Secondary  legislation  for  a  stability  pact  may  be  adopted  on  the  basis  of the  2nd 
subparagraph, i.e.  amending the Protocol, as this provides for the adoption of appropriate 
provisions relating to the implementation of  the excessive deficit procedure. The potential 
scope of the Protocol is therefore larger than what is set out in the present Protocol, and 
could cover the definitions, deadlines etc. mentioned above. 
In contrast, the 3rd subparagraph has a much narrower scope limited to the "detailed rules 
and  definitions for the application of  the provisions of  the said Protocol". It can therefore 
only  be used to provided  ancillary  technical  clarification's  of .existing  provisions  in  the 
Protocol. It could not be used to extend the scope of  the ProtocoF. 
A  Stability  Council .  as  a decision-making body  different  from  the Council  could not be 
created by secondary legislation,  in particular since Article  1  04c(9) and  (11) provide for 
the Council to decide. It has to be kept in mind, however, that under these provisions, the 
.  Council decides with the voting rights of the Member States with a derogation suspended 
(Article  109k(3)  and  (5)).  For the  purposes  of Article  104c(9)  and  (11),  the ECOFIN 
Council could "politically" be referred to as the "Stability Council". 
III.2 THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
It is  worth  bearing  in  mind  that  the  European  Parliameqt  has  since  1993  called  for 
legislation on the multilateral surveillance procedure: legislation would have to be adopted 
using the "cooperation" procedure of  Article 189c. 
6  This has already been used for Regulation 3605/93. 
7  The deadline "before 1 January 1994" is no obstacle to using the 3d subparagraph as a legal basis to 
amend the Regulation. - 10-
As  for  legislation relating  to the  excessive  deficit  procedure,  secondary  legislation may 
have  to  be  adopted  using  the  2nd  subparagraph  for  which  the  Council  must  act 
unanimously  after consulting both the Parliament and  the ECB.  The  amendment  of the 
Protocol would de facto be a Treaty amendment,  with primary law being  converted to 
secondary  legislation.  While  the  clarification  of interpretations  and  deadlines  would 
supplement  existing  provisions  of the  Protocol,  there is  a  risk  that a  debate  would  be 
opened on the reference values. 
To  amend Regulation 3605/93  using  the  3rd  subparagraph,  the Council  decides  on the 
basis of  a qualified majority after consulting the European Parliament. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ASPECTS 
IV. I STRENGTHENING SURVEILLANCE AT EU LEVEL 
The.  move  into  stage  three  implies  a  need  for  a  reinforced  and  speedier  exchange  of 
information  about  Member  States'  budgetary  positions  and  intentions  and  a  stronger 
interaction between policy-making at Member State level  and  the EU level.  This will  be 
desirable for both budgetary discipline and policy co-ordination purposes. 
The idea would be to build on the existing experience with convergence programmes, but 
to take the opportunity to specify more clearly (in secondary legislation) the obligations on 
Member States, the Commission and the Council, and the procedures to be followed.  The 
approach is thus first to 
11 give more teeth" to the multilateral surveillance process8 so that 
appropriate  warnings  ("yellow  cards")  and  recommendations  can  be  made  to  Member 
States before they breach the 3% of GDP deficit limit and  so that more attention can be 
given  to  achieving  an  appropriate  budgetary  stance  for  the  single  currency  zone  as  a 
whole. 
In the event that Member States did breach the 3% of GDP limit then the full force of the 
excessive deficit procedure would be brought into play, leading to Council decisions ("red 
cards 
11
,  but  no  sending  oft)  and  recommendations,  and  the  imposition  of sanctions  if 
adequate corrective action has not been taken by  the Member States concerned;  all  this  · 
needs to be carried out expeditiously and in a predictable way so· that the excessive deficit 
8  Economic  policy  and  multilateral  surveillance  are  not  just  about  budgetary  policy.  Secondary 
legislation to deal with the aspects focused on in this note might also be extended to encompass other 
concerns. - 11  -
procedure  has  genuine  deterrent  value.  To  this  end  the  interpretation  of the  deficit 
criterion, the delays between the successive steps of the procedure, and  the nature of the 
sanctions  and  their  application should  be  defined  more  clearly  and  tightly.  However,  it 
would be incompatible with the  Treaty to  seek  to override the basic provisions  on the 
excessive deficit procedure in the Treaty; some discretion must be retained  and Member 
States should have a minimum period to convert their gross errors. 
More concretely,  it  is  proposed that  existing  procedures  should  be  developed  so  as  to 
cover the following elements. 
Member States participating in the single currency should be required to submit regular 
statements of  their medium-term budgetary strategy ("stability programmes"), indicating in 
particular: 
- the medium-term objective for the  general government budget balance; 
- the adjustment path to reach this medium-term objective; 
- the adjustment measures to be taken to follow this path; 
- arrangements for regular (twice a year?), transparent and public self-monitoring of the 
general government finances and prospects; 
- a commitment to take additional (pre-specified?) measures to correct for slippage from 
the adjustment path not due to the cycle. 
Member States should be asked .to submit their programme in draft form (i.e.  before final 
adoption  by  the  government  and  presentation  to  the  national  parliamet?-t)  for  prior 
consultation with and  assessment by  the  Commission  and  the  Council  (assisted  by  the 
Economic and Financial Committee). 
At EU level, the Commission and the Council would: 
- assess whether the medium-term objective set by a Member State was consistent with 
the general objective of  the stability pact and  ~ppropriat~ to the specific features of the 
country (margin for  cyclical fluctuations,  provision for  burden of ageing  population, 
etc:), whether the period of transition was appropriate or appeared unduly long,  and 
whether the measures proposed were sufficient to. achieve the adjustment aimed for; 
- if necessary, request strengthening of  unsatisfactory elements of the programme before 
final  adoption  by  the  Member  State  government  and  before  formal  Council· 
endorsement; - 12-
monitor implementation of the programme and warn a Member State of the need for 
additional adjustment measures if actual developments (allowing for the cycle) showed 
slippages from the agreed medium-term path. The Commission might make a report and 
adopt an  opinion (on the risk of an  excessive deficit) under paragraphs 3-5  of article 
1  04c  or  under  rules  developed  for  article  1  03  and  the  Council  could  make 
recommendations to the Member State as in para 4 of  article 103; 
- review the overall  budgetary position in  the single  currency zone (and  the EU as  a 
whole) based on the actual and planned budgetary stances of  the Member States, and as 
a consequence make general recommendations when necessary. 
Secondary legislation (on the basis of article 1  03 (  5)) could thus: 
- include an  obligation on participating Member States to  submit  stability  programmes 
(there would be  a parallel  obligation  on  Member States with a  derogation to  submit 
convergence programmes); 
- define the minimum contents of such programmes, when they should be submitted and 
in what circumstances or how often they should replaced; 
- define  the  procedures  to  be  followed  by  Commission  and  Council  in  assessing  and 
monitoring stability programmes and in making recommendations to Member States. 
Secondary  legislation  could  be  adopted  on  the  implementation  of all  aspects  of the 
excessive deficit procedure on the basis of  article 1  04c(14) with a view to: 
- clarifying the  ~nterpretation of certain Treaty provisions, for example the definition of 
effective action in response to Council recommendations under article 1  04c(8); 
- establishing  detailed  procedural  arrangements  and  deadlines  for  each  step  of the 
procedure, for example the imposition of  sanctions as set out in article 1  04c(9-ll  ); 
- laying  down the scale of,  and  further  defining  the sanctions to be imposed- based on 
article 1  04c(ll  ). 
IV.2 IMPROVING BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
The  approach  described  above,  based  on  a  strengthening  of both  surveillance  and  the 
excessive  deficit  procedure,  is  intended  to  provide  a  framework  in  which  corrective 
measures are taken by Member States before budgetary situations get out of hand, and so 
the imposition of  sanctions, although always there as a deterrent, would hopefully rarely be 
needed in practice.  The setting of budgetary policy remains  a national responsibility,  but 
subject  to tighter  checks  and  constraints.  While  the  main  emphasis  of this  note  is  on - 13  -
developing Community procedures, successful budgetary discipline will in the end depend 
on improved procedures at  national level  for set-ting  objectives and  taking the necessary 
measures to remain on track. Enhanced and  more transparent self-monitoring, which has 
already been encouraged during the evolving  exp~rience with convergence programmes, is 
an important first  step to taking corrective action.  The scope for the triggering of  auto-
correction mechanisms when slippage becomes evident needs further consideration. Would 
it be possible for Community legislation to impose a requirement for the establishing (and 
activation, when necessary) of such mechanisms in  each Member State? The diversity of 
consti.tutional and budgetary traditions would make a uniform approach difficult,  although 
Member States have certain obligations in this area according to article 3 of the Protocol. 
As  a  minimum,  each  Member  State  in  its  stability  .programme  should  state  a  firm 
commitment to take corrective action when necessary artd  demonstrate in  concrete terms 
how this commitment would be respected. In some Member States this is likely to require 
changes in constitutions or budgetary law. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION 
The stability pact proposal of Mr.  Waigel aims  at ensuring the maintenance of budgetary 
discipline once in EMU; to this end the preceding analysis suggests a fuller  specification 
and  reinforcement of the relevant provisions of the Treaty and  of existing  practices for 
economic  policy  co-ordination.  A  consensus  already . exists  that  the  requirements  for 
participation in  EMU (either in  the first  group  or at a later date)  should  in no way be 
changed and,  more generally,  any  new arrangements should be fully  consistent with and 
require no amendment of  the Treaty. 
Budgetary discipline in stage three of  EMU is a pre·· requisite for enjoying the full  benefits 
of the single currency. Moreover, by avoiding an  overburdening of monetary policy,  it is 
also  a necessary,  though not sufficient  condition for macroeconomic  stabilisation at the 
national and  the EU level.  Maintenance of sound public finance  positions in  EMU will 
require a  str~ngthened commitment from individual Member States which  should  aim  in 
the  medium  term  for  a  government  balance  considerably  better  than  the  3%  deficit 
reference value. 
A consensus appears to emerge that: 
- the government deficit/surplus should be the operational  objt-,"'.~ive;  seeking to impose 
an  additional  constraint on the  gross  debt  ratio  appears  to  be  ::.uperfluous  as  setting - I4-
more ambitious targets than the 3% reference value would ensure a downward trend in 
the debt ratio to well below 60% of GDP; 
- a medium-term objective of a budget position close to  bala~ce is  appropriate for the 
Union as a whole, but some differentiation for individual countries is desirable from an 
economic point of  view; 
- a reinforcement of surveillance at the national and EU level is necessary to ensure the 
achievement and the respect of  national budgetary targets. 
Nevertheless,  a  number  of issues  remain  to  be  discussed  in  detail.  In  the  light  of the 
analysis  and  proposals  in  the  earlier  sections  of this  note,  what  is  the  position  of the 
Committee on the following items: 
1  . There exists a large agreement on the need to strengthen budgetary surveillance. What 
are  the  views  of members  on  the  need  to  establish  in  legislation  the  operational 
modalities of the multilateral surveillance procedure, and if so, what procedures would 
they  propose?  Do  members  consider  it  appropriate  to  specify  the  objectives  of a  _ 
stability pact in the broad economic policy guidelines? 
2.  Do members agree that Article I 04c( I4) provides the possibility to amend the excessive 
deficit  procedure  to  incorporate  elements  of the  proposed  stability  pact?  If so,  do 
members  consider  the  2nd  subparagraph  or  the  3rd  subparagraph  to  be  the  most 
appropriate  legal  base  for  adopting  the  majority  of interpretations,  deadlines  etc. 
necessary for speeding up the excessive deficit procedure? 
3.  Do members agree that an essential element of  budgetary discipline will be the existence 
and effective use of credible auto-correction meGhanisms  at national level? What role 
can be played  at  Community  level  to  ensure  that  such  mechanisms  are  established? 
What  specific  ideas  do  members  have  about  innovations  in  the  budgetary  control 
process  which  would  be  helpful  in  their  own  countries  in  this  respect?  What  legal 
changes in national systems may be needed and appear possible? 
4.  The necessary drive towards strengthened fiscal discipline needs to be complemented by 
the  appropriate fiscal  policy  coordination  in  order to  ensure  a  consistent  budgetary 
stance for EMU as a whole.  To this end, is there a need to introduce legislation which 
clarifies  the provisions of Art.  I 03  of the  Treaty. in  the  direction  of closer  ex-ante 
coordination of  national budgetary policies? - 15-
ANNEX 
REINFORCING MARKET PRESSURE ON FISCAL BEHAVIOUR 
This  annex  explores  some  tentative  avenues  in  order  to  increase  market  pressure  on 
. budgetary authorities. The Commission services are aware of  the preliminary character and 
the possible limitations of these ideas which, in any case, would need to be discussed with 
the competent supervisory specialists to check their feasibility and effectiveness. 
1. TREATY PROV1SIONS 
The  Treaty  provisions  aiming  at  strengthening  fiscal  discipline  are  broader  than  the 
excessive deficit procedure.  The Treaty contains a number of elements that reinforce the 
role of  market pressure in favour of  fiscal discipline. These elements ne~d to be considered 
as part of  the discussion concerning the stability pact. 
Markets can play a very strong role in putting pressure on governments in favour of sound 
public finance.  This is the principle behind the approach reflected in the Treaty of placing 
sovereign governments in as  similar position as  possible to any  other debtor when they 
need to raise funds. 
There are four main provisions in the Treaty stating in concrete terms the above mentioned 
principle: 
•  Article  104  and 1  04a:  prohibition  of monetary  financing  and  privileged  access  to 
financial institutions. Central banks of the Member States may no longer grant directly 
any  credit to the public· sector.  Likewise,  the authorities of the Member  States and 
those  of the European Union  are  no  longer  allowed  to  impose  rules  on  financial 
institutions which constitute privileged access of  the public sector to the funds of  these 
institutions. The purpose is to submit the public sector in its borrowing behaviour to 
the same constraints as those of  the private sector. 
•  Article 104 b:  no bail-out rule:  neither the Community nor its Member States shall be 
liable for or assume the commitments of governments o£ any Member State. This rule 
is designed to dispel any investor's doubt, or hope, about the risk they run in financing 
governments that incur excessive deficits. 
•  Article 104c: excessive deficit procedure. The procequre may lead to the publication of 
Council  recommendations  addressed  to  a. specific  Member  States.  Par.  11  also 
provides  for  the  publication  of additional  information  before  issuing  bonds  and - 16-
securities  as  one  of the  possible  sanctions  m  the  case  of  persistent  budgetary 
disequilibria.  That  would  result  in  an  increasing  market  pressure  on  this  country 
(market asks a higher price on its debt) to adopt corrective measures in favour of  fiscal 
discipline. 
In addition,  in the single  currency area,  the power of money creation will  rest with the 
ECB, the independent central bank whose prior objective is  price  stability.  Without the 
power  to  print  money  and  with  an  explicit  no  bail-out  rule,  governments  will  find 
themselves in a position quite similar to any other debtor.  The government will retain its 
power to tax, but it will be limited by 'tax competition' within the single market. 
2. REINFORCING THE SYSTEM OF PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION 
Given the constraints mentioned  above,  if a Member  State has  been judged publicly to 
have an excessive deficit,  the market will impose a financial  penalty in the form of a risk 
premium in interest rates on public debt. 
Such a situation should be reflected in  the system of prudential supervision.  On the one 
hand, the system has to ensure that the financial  markets can withstand any shock which 
may result from unsound  public finance.  On  the other hand,  the system  could reinforce 
market discipline on public finance. 
There are mainly two concepts of prudential supervision which could be examined in the 
light of  what has been said/id above: (i) the assumption that claims on central governments 
within the EU countries are all  treated the same way;  and  (ii)  that these claims  can be 
considered  as  risk  free.  These  concepts  are  at  the  basis  of the  system  of prudential 
supervision.  They are particularly relevant for the determination of the solvency ratio of 
credit institutions,  large exposures rules  and  capital  adequacy.  These concepts could be 
modified to take account of  the differentiated public finance positions of  Member States. 
The  Council  Directive  92/121/EEC  dictates  rules  for  monitoring  and  controlling  large 
exposure of credit institutions. This is  an integral part of prudential supervision; excessive 
concentration may  result  in  an  unacceptable  risk;  and  such  a  situation may  be  deemed 
prejudicial  to the solvency  of a  credit institution.  No Member  State is  expected to run 
fiscal  policies which might cast doubt on the value of its debts.  However, in an extreme 
case,  a Member State could theoretically be tempted to consolitate public debt or apply 
any other mechanism which might reduce its value.  The large exposure directive could be 
modified to take into account such a possibility,  in  particular in the definition of limits to 
be applied to  large exposure operations.  If that were to be the  case,  the Member State - 17-
runmng  unsound  fiscal  policies  would  suffer  negative  discrimination,  stnce  credit 
institutions would prefer to operate with other Member States' debt. 
The  capital  adequacy  requirements,  provided  for  by  Council  Directive  93/6/EEC,  are 
specifically based on the assumption that all claims on central governments within the EU 
countries will be treated in the same way.  In the case that the excessive deficit procedure 
reaches  a  decision  to  impose  sanctions  on  a  specific  Member  State,  would  it  still  be 
adequate to treat claims on this country in the same way as others? At this stage, it could 
be considered that· the Member State concerned should be treated like any  other debtor. 
This  approach  could  be  reflected  in  particular  in· the  articles  of the  capital  adequacy 
directive referring to provisions  against  risk  as  well  as  monitoring  and  control of large 
exposures. 
Financial institutions are required to keep a market value accounting.  This concept should 
cover all types of public debt that are held by all types of financial institution. The system 
should  ensure  that  any  deterioration  in  the  price  of a  Member  State's  debts  is  fully 
recognised in the profit and loss account of  the financial institutions holding such debts. In 
that way,  price changes in the debt reflecting unsound public finance,  would immediately 
be passed through and taken into account by the whole syst.em of  supervision. 
The implementation of  this approach would require a modification of  the Community legal 
acts concerned. Since most of  the prudential supervision rules are embodied in Community 
legislation, .;rjt  should  not  be  impossible  to  introduce  modifications.  However,  the 
.  . <, 
consistency of any such modifications with international rules (Basle Agreement, etc.) on 
prudential supervision would need to be checked. 